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Dispute Resolution Under a North American
Free Trade Agreement
by Louis B. Sohn*
We have been told repeatedly during this conference that a North
American free trade area can become a reality only if both the deci-
sion makers and the industry on each side of the border believe that there
will be a secure and predictable access to the markets on the other side of
the border for their products, services, and investments. To achieve that
end, there must be an agreement on the basic rules governing such access
and on an adequate system of resolving conflicts relating to the interpre-
tation and application of these rules. Neither the rules nor the dispute
settlement system can exist in a vacuum; they depend on each other.
There must be both procedures for interpreting rules, and rules to be
interpreted. At present, there are many disputes between the two coun-
tries, but there are few agreed rules providing a basis for resolving them.
Even where there is some law available, there are no effective means for
interpreting and applying it.
It has been assumed for too long that any problems between Canada
and the United States, two friendly allies sharing the longest undefended
border in the world, can be easily solved by our excellent diplomats and
will quickly disappear. Unfortunately, this is a dream, not the truth. It
takes a large amount of time and many painful efforts to solve a dispute
between these two countries, and many conflicts languish forevermore,
and after a while are only remembered by the keepers of the national
archives.
In fact, there are too many disputes between the United States and
Canada, perhaps several hundred of them; not all are important enough
to rate headlines in the newspapers, but all of them are of importance to
some persons, individuals or corporations, who are affected by some acts
of one government or the other. These disputes do not stop coming;
before one is solved, another arises, in the same area or in a completely
different one. Ordinarily, most of these disputes are of intermittent con-
cern only to a few officials on both sides of the border, and sooner or later
many of them are satisfactorily solved. Only some of these disputes rise
to a higher level, catch attention of Congressmen or Senators, or of those
newspapers which thrive on pointing out that things are not what they
seem to be, and do not hesitate to point out that one of the two countries
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is not complying with international obligations, and that grave injustice
has been inflicted by it on the citizens of the other country.
What is being done about it? What can be done about it? Over the
last few centuries, diplomats and international lawyers devised various
ways of dealing with international disputes, and they are very proud that
in a preponderant majority of situations they have worked quite success-
fully. At the same time, it has become quite obvious that in a variety of
cases these methods are not satisfactory, and that in the area of interna-
tional economic relations-in particular those involving trade and invest-
ment across the border between Canada and the United States-there
seems to be a breakdown in efforts to settle problems, whether big or
small. The big issues are too political, too dangerous to touch; they have
to be defused, brought to a lower level where the general public and the
press will be less conscious of them, and only then is it possible to handle
them in a more professional way. As far as the small issues are con-
cerned, they are often swept away as not deserving attention of the over-
worked public servants; the old Roman maxim, de minimis non curat
praetor (the magistrate is not concerned with small matters), is still a
guiding principle of international relations. There has to be a significant,
substantial, or serious effect, impact, or injury before governments be-
come interested in a particular situation.
If we assume, however, that the problem before us falls within the
middle range, and is neither too big nor too small, what is going to hap-
pen to it? It would seem obvious that whenever existing methods are not
good enough, the two governments would find some better ones; but un-
fortunately, the governments seem to be unable to take positive steps in
that direction.
It might be useful, therefore, to take an inventory of existing meth-
ods to find why they are no longer working, and to try to find a way of
improving them. It is too often forgotten that there are many tried and
true methods for resolving international disputes, and that the choice of a
proper method may expedite the settlement of a dispute.'
The usual progression is from the simpler methods to the more com-
plicated, starting with negotiation and proceeding through consultations,
good offices, mediation, commissions of inquiry, conciliation commis-
sions, and arbitral tribunals, to international courts. Most disputes are
solved on the lower levels, and only a few intractable ones reach the high-
est one; but, of course, as noted before, many disputes fall between the
cracks, are not solved by negotiation, and, for one reason or another,
never reach the next level. For them there is still one more possible solu-
tion-resort to national courts or administrative agencies-which often
I For recent reviews of the international dispute settlement methods, see J. MERRILS, INTER-
NATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1984); L. SOHN, The Future of Dispute Settlement in MACDON-
ALD & JOHNSTON, THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND THEORY (1983).
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results in objections by the other country and in escalating the dispute to
an international level. In fact, it is the discovery of these remedies, which
have been multiplied by national legislators anxious to help their constit-
uents, that has brought the whole situation to our present impasse.
Returning to the means available to Canada and the United States
for the settlement of disputes between them, the foremost among them is
negotiation. It is generally agreed that negotiation is the primary, most
frequently used, method for settling international disputes. All diplo-
mats give a priority to it, and most international agreements on the set-
tlement of disputes require that a dispute should be settled, as far as
possible, by negotiations. Only if a dispute is not resolved by negotia-
tions does resort to other means become necessary. It is a basic axiom of
diplomacy that with patience and perseverance, all disputes will be re-
solved sooner or later. Most trade disputes are sensitive, however, to
delays, as economic losses are usually proportionate to the length of a
delay. For instance, if a trade dispute delays the entry of a loaded ship
into a harbor for a few months, the losses may reach even a million dol-
lars. An opportunity for a sale may be missed or an entire cargo may be
spoiled.
To avoid such dangers, several methods for expediting negotiations
have been developed. The simplest one is the establishment of a special
channel for constant trade consultations. For this purpose, a bilateral
permanent commission might be appointed, with commissioners and
staff working together: to anticipate problems; to stop an incipient dis-
pute at the earliest possible moment, before it escalates into a bitter dis-
pute; to find an equitable solution for a particular dispute or for a group
of disputes; or to decide what other dispute settlement procedure should
be used to find such solution.
Sometimes, without relinquishing its jurisdiction, such a commis-
sion might invite a specially qualified person to join the commission, and
by his or her good offices help the parties to narrow the gap between their
positions. In other situations, such a person may be invited to engage in
mediation, and to resolve the dispute by making a variety of proposals,
one of which might prove to be acceptable to the parties. When a dispute
involves contested facts, the commission may appoint a joint group of
experts to elucidate the facts, or arrange for the appointment of a com-
mission of inquiry, which would conduct an impartial and conscientious
investigation and present a report on the facts ascertained thereby.
If none of these approaches results in a settlement of the dispute, the
parties still have three other avenues open: conciliation, arbitration, and
judicial settlement. The common feature of these procedures is that a
third-party element is involved. While parties might appoint their na-
tionals to participate in these procedures, the final determination is in the
hands of a neutral person or group of persons. A conciliation commis-
sion tries first to bring about an agreement between the parties by sug-
gesting to them various terms of settlement. If it does not persuade the
3
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parties to accept a settlement, the commission presents a report contain-
ing its findings with respect to facts and the law, and its recommenda-
tions for a friendly settlement of the dispute. The main difference
between conciliation and the two other third-party methods is that its
recommendations are not binding, while an arbitral tribunal or a court
usually renders a binding decision.
An arbitral tribunal is established in a similar manner as a concilia-
tion commission, and the principal difference between it and an interna-
tional court is that it is established specially for a particular dispute or
group of disputes, while a court is usually a permanent body, composed
of judges previously elected, and the parties ordinarily have only a minor
influence on the composition of the court (for instance, by adding to it
national judges, each party selecting one). The decisions of arbitral tribu-
nals and courts are binding on the parties to a dispute, and they are usu-
ally final, as appeals are seldom allowed in international proceedings.
All these methods can, of course, be applied to trade disputes, and
each method has some advantages and some disadvantages. If the par-
ties are cooperative and really want to find a solution for their problems,
any one of them can lead to a result acceptable to both of them. It is,
however, a rather disconcerting fact that a government might find it diffi-
cult to accept a solution which some influential groups in its country
might find objectionable, and at the end of the lengthy proceedings a
government might find it necessary to refuse to follow a recommendation
of a conciliation commission, and even reject a binding decision of a tri-
bunal or a court.
In the "good old days," if a government refused to comply with a
decision of an international tribunal, a major power could enforce the
decision by using military force. Of course, this remedy was not avail-
able to a small country against a big one, unless a friend intervened on its
behalf. In the world of the United Nations, where use of force has been
almost completely prohibited, the international community would not
condone the use of force even for the purpose of executing a tribunal's
decision. The dangers of escalation are too great, and there is no eco-
nomic loss that would justify provoking a nuclear war.
We need to go back now to our drawing board, and reconsider the
various means at our disposal and see how we can use them best to deal
with the trade disputes between the United States and Canada under the
proposed free trade agreement. We do not approach the issue with clean
hands. There are in front of us many unresolved disputes, embittering
our relations, and antagonizing various groups in Canada or the United
States, and often in both countries.
As was noted earlier, a system for the settlement of disputes cannot
exist in a vacuum. The negotiators of the free trade treaty between Can-
ada and the United States have agreed to work first on the rules which
would provide the law to be applied by those called upon to settle a dis-
pute under the free trade treaty. It is clear that the main reason for many
Vol. 12:319 1987
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conflicts is the lack of clear provisions or a gap in existing provisions
(e.g., those of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and that
better rules are needed.
Once a basic agreement is reached on the rules to be applied, the
next step will be to agree on the procedures and institutions which would
apply them. At present, in the gray areas where the rules are unclear,
both the rules and remedies are provided mostly by national legislation
and national courts, to the great dissatisfaction of the other country
which considers it below its dignity and a violation of the sovereign
equality of states that the court of another country would judge the valid-
ity of its acts and would take steps against its nationals on the basis of its
own legislature's interpretation of the applicable rules.
It has to be remembered that law seldom stands still. Assuming that
we succeed in clarifying and codifying all the necessary rules, they will
still have to be interpreted and will have to be applied to constantly
changing economic situations resulting in consequential changes in the
terms of trade and investment. The institutions engaged in applying
these new rules cannot be purely national, as even with the best inten-
tions the interpretations on both sides of the border are likely to start to
diverge almost immediately.
Many proposals have already been made for joint institutions that
would be capable of dealing with the complex relations between Canada
and the United States in the light of the proposed free trade area agree-
ment.2 This is not the place and there is no time to analyze them all. I
shall restrict myself to a selection of those ideas which appear in some
other free trade area agreements,3 adding here and there a few ideas be-
ing discussed right now by a Joint Working Group of the American and
Canadian Bar Associations which a few years ago presented a compre-
2 For an excellent review of the substantive problems involved in the free trade agreement, see
Finlayson & Thomas, The Elements of a Canada-United States Comprehensive Trade Agreement, 20
INT'L LAW 1307-34 (1986). See also S. Battram, Canada-United States Trade Negotiations: Conti-
nental Accord or a Continent Apart? (Paper presented to the Conference of Int'l Trade, Texas Bar
Ass'n and Int'l Trade and Practice Section of the A.B.A., Dallas, Tex., Feb. 6, 1987); FRIED, Barri-
ers to United States-Canadian Trade: Problems and Solutions, The Canadian Perspective, 19 GEo.
WASH. L.REV. 433-41 (1985).
3 For the dispute settlement proposals contained in the MacDonald Report, see REPORT OF
THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS OF CANADA
(1980) at 320-322. For the views of former U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Ken Curtis, see 3 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), 1429 (1986). A comprehensive analysis of the issues involved may be found in
F. STONE, INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND FORM OF THE PROPOSED CANADA-U.S. TRADE
AGREEMENT (1986); see also, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY, DIS-
PUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS IN A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1986). This paper takes into
account dispute settlement provisions in the following free trade area agreements: Agreement Estab-
lishing a Free Trade Area, Dec. 14, 1965, Ireland - United Kingdom, art. XVII, 565 U.N.T.S. 60.
Closer Economic-Trade Relations, Mar. 28, 1983, Australia - New Zealand, art. XXII, 22. I.L.M.
945; Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, art. XVII-XIX, 24 I.L.M. 65. Similar provisions
are found in Reciprocal Trade Agreement, Nov. 15, 1935, Canada-United States, art. XI, 49 Stat.
3960, E.A.S. No. 91, 6 Bevans 75.
5
Sohn: Dispute Resolution under a North American Free Trade Agreement
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1987
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
hensive report on the settlement of disputes between Canada and the
United States.4 It is now engaged in adapting the ideas developed at that
time to the special requirements of a free trade area agreement. It is
hoped that its report will be available in the near future. The co-chair-
men of that group are two persons present here, Henry King and Brad
Smith, to whose persistence and untiring efforts in pursuing this elusive
goal the lawyers of the two countries owe a great debt of gratitude.
It is generally agreed that crucial political decisions will continue to
be made by the heads of the two governments and their top ministers and
special trade advisers. It is not likely, however, that these high personali-
ties will be able to devote much attention to the constant flood of
problems that require solution and that are technical and legal. It has
been, therefore, proposed that a permanent joint trade commission be
established, similar to the Canada-United States International Joint
Commission which for almost 80 years has dealt successfully with
boundary waters and related problems.5 This commission would moni-
tor the progress of implementation of the agreement; it would be a
"watchdog," with access to all relevant information sources on a routine
basis. Its primary duty would be to keep informed about current devel-
opments, to discover promptly any trouble spots that may be developing,
and to immediately advise the two governments on the need to deal with
them quickly before they develop into a dispute or a dangerous situation.
The two governments may decide to deal with the problem through dip-
lomatic channels, to start negotiations or to establish a working group for
more thorough consultations on the subject. Ordinarily, however, they
will authorize the joint commission to establish a joint working group of
experts on the particular topic in dispute. The experts will submit to the
joint commission their report on the facts underlying the dispute and on
the ways similar disputes have been resolved elsewhere, together with
suggestions for resolving the dispute studied by them. The joint commis-
sion may then decide that the report is satisfactory or that some addi-
tional studies, economic, legal or technical, are necessary and may
appoint an additional working group or groups, for that purpose. Once
the joint commission is satisfied that it has all the necessary facts, evalua-
4 Report and Recommendations of the American and Canadian Bar Associations Joint Work-
ing Group on the Settlement of International Disputes between Canada and the United States
(presented Mar. 20, 1979, adopted by A.B.A. Aug. 15, 1979, adopted by CBA Aug. 30, 1979).
For a comment on the Report and Recommendation see E. Wang, Adjudication of Canada-U.S.
Disputes, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. (1981), at 158-228.
5 For the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, see Use of Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909,
Canada-United States, 36 Stat. 2448, TS 551, 12 Bevans 319. Concerning the accomplishments of
the International Joint Commission, see L. BLOOMFIELD: G. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATERS
PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (1985), The Regime of Boundary Waters: The
Canadian United States Experience, 1975 Recueil de Cours 219-340; THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON (R. Spenser, J. Kirton & K. Nossal eds. 1981); 3 DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 813-71 (M. Whiteman ed. 1964). See also, M. Cohen, Canada and the U.S.:
New Approaches to Undeadly Quarrel, INT'L PERSPECTIVES, Mar./Apr. 1985, at 16-22.
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tions and recommendations before it, it would prepare a final report,
with its own recommendations, for the two governments. These recom-
mendations may relate to the substance of the dispute or to the procedure
to be followed in solving it. The joint commission may consider, for in-
stance, that the situation cannot be resolved by the two parties alone, and
may recommend that a mediator or a conciliation commission be ap-
pointed, or it may conclude that the dispute cannot be solved without
obtaining the advice of an international arbitral tribunal or an interna-
tional court on some of the legal issues involved, especially on questions
of interpretation of the free trade agreement. Depending on the charac-
ter of the dispute, at that point the two governments might take over the
problem and reach a solution on the basis of the studies and recommen-
dations received from the joint commission. If a settlement is not agreed
upon, the two governments may refer all or some of the issues to one of
the institutions suggested by the joint commission, or return the matter
to that commission for the selection of the mediator, conciliation com-
mission, arbitral tribunal, or court.
To properly fulfill its functions, the joint commission would have to
be a semi-autonomous body, authorized to consider each problem as ob-
jectively as possible, not in an adversarial but a collegial mode. While its
members will be appointed by the governments and would remain in suf-
ficiently close contact with the two governments in order to remain fa-
miliar with the governments' attitudes and positions with respect to
matters considered by the commission, their primary task will be to
jointly find the best, the most reasonable and equitable, solution for each
issue so that the two governments would find it difficult to reject it.
Although most proposals suggest that each government appoint three
commissioners, the possibility might also be considered that each govern-
ment appoint four commissioners, so that the commission would be able
to work in two sections, one in Ottawa and one in Washington, each of
which would be composed of two nationals of Canada and two nationals
of the United States. One section would deal with issues arising primar-
ily in Canada, and the other with those arising primarily in the United
States. Modern technology should enable the two sections to work
closely together, to share all the documentation and data, to consult con-
stantly, and to meet frequently to consider together questions that re-
quire direct personal contact and collegial action.
The joint commission should have small but sufficient and highly
qualified binational, integrated staff. It should also have available a joint
advisory group of experts from various government departments, univer-
sities and agricultural, commercial and industrial enterprises. This
group would be especially helpful in advising on the selection of experts
for particular studies.
The joint commission would also establish a list of third-country
experts, both technical and legal, acceptable to both governments, from
7
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which mediators and members of conciliation commissions and arbitral
tribunals would be chosen.
Mediators and conciliators would usually be chosen for each partic-
ular case, but the two governments may wish to establish a special joint
arbitral tribunal that could give them an impartial and authoritative in-
terpretation of the free trade agreement. The two governments have in
the past resorted, relatively frequently, to the special panels established
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, not so much against
each other, as against the European Economic Community and some
states in other regions. They have not been completely satisfied with that
experience, and there seems to be a consensus that something stronger is
definitely necessary for the interpretation of the free trade agreement.
Instead of a constant procession of different tribunals, it would be prefer-
able to have a permanent tribunal of five or seven judges able to develop a
consistent jurisprudence, thus giving to the whole system a stability
which is needed not only by the two governments, but even more by the
business interests involved whose expensive plans for future development
depend considerably on the existence of a common interpretation system
that is a reliable one, and not on unilateral interpretations which the
other country is likely to reject quite often.
In addition, such a tribunal might enable the governments to get out
to some extent of the dispute settlement operation by putting the burden
of obtaining the correct interpretation of the free trade agreement on the
real parties to the dispute, the economic interests on both sides of the
border. The private persons, natural or legal, that are directly con-
cerned, may be authorized to obtain directly from the joint tribunal a
solution for their problem, without bringing their governments into the
fight. This method has solved many problems in the European Eco-
nomic Community,6 and may prove equally helpful in settling disputes
relating to the free trade agreement which have arisen between American
and Canadian individuals, corporations, or interest groups. It might be
useful, therefore, to provide in the free trade agreement for their direct
participation in the settlement of this kind of dispute.
The procedure that might be used for this purpose might be as
follows:
A private person, an individual or a corporation, whose rights, inter-
ests, or duties might be seriously affected by a court proceeding or an
administrative action relating to the application of the free trade agree-
ment, would be entitled to ask for a reference of an issue of interpretation
of that agreement by the court or administrative agency to the proposed
joint Canada-United States tribunal for advice. In such a case, the pro-
6 See European Economic Community Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, art. CDXXVII, 298 U.N.T.S.
11. See also T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 247-82 (1981); S.
STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PER-
SPECTIVE 261-71 (1976).
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ceedings before the court or the administrative agency would be sus-
pended until the joint tribunal has transmitted its reply to the requesting
institution. The national court or agency would then resume proceed-
ings, and would apply the interpretation given by the joint tribunal to the
facts of the case.
This procedure would contribute to uniform interpretation of the
free trade agreement on both sides of the border, and would prevent the
escalation of each private conflict into an inter-governmental dispute. It
would avoid, at the same time, the difficulty that might be presented by a
procedure relying on appeal to an international tribunal from a decision
of a national court or agency. It is much easier for a national court or
agency to apply an interpretation given by an international tribunal, than
to suffer the indignity of having its decision reversed on appeal by an
outside tribunal. National pride is thus protected, justice is provided,
and governments are saved from protracted negotiations and an increase
in animosities that might jeopardize the whole trade relationship.
This paper has only touched a few main points, and leaves many
questions unanswered, including some which, I hope, will be discussed
by other speakers. I have, in particular, in mind the relationship to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,7 changes to which are being
negotiated at the same time. If the negotiations between Canada and the
United States are successful, they can light the way for the other, even
more complex, negotiations.
7 For a review of the GAIT dispute settlement procedures R. HUDEC, GAT Dispute Settle-
ment After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J., 146-99 (1980);
USITC, Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute Settlement Under GATT and the Tokyo
Round Agreements.
See generally K. DAM, THE GAIT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1987); R.
Hudec, Paper presented on legal issues in US/EC Trade Policy: GATT Litigation, 1960-1985, at
Conference on Europe/US Trade Relations at Centre for European Studies in Brussels (1986); J.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).
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